Federated discovery and sharing of genomic data using Beacons by Fiume, Marc et al.








Federated discovery and sharing of genomic data using Beacons
Fiume, Marc ; Cupak, Miroslav ; Keenan, Stephen ; Rambla, Jordi ; de la Torre, Sabela ; Dyke,
Stephanie O M ; Brookes, Anthony J ; Carey, Knox ; Lloyd, David ; Goodhand, Peter ; Haeussler,
Maximilian ; Baudis, Michael ; Stockinger, Heinz ; Dolman, Lena ; Lappalainen, Ilkka ; Törnroos, Juha
; Linden, Mikael ; Spalding, J Dylan ; Ur-Rehman, Saif ; Page, Angela ; Flicek, Paul ; Sherry, Stephen ;
Haussler, David ; Varma, Susheel ; Saunders, Gary ; Scollen, Serena
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41587-019-0046-x






The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Fiume, Marc; Cupak, Miroslav; Keenan, Stephen; Rambla, Jordi; de la Torre, Sabela; Dyke, Stephanie
O M; Brookes, Anthony J; Carey, Knox; Lloyd, David; Goodhand, Peter; Haeussler, Maximilian; Baudis,
Michael; Stockinger, Heinz; Dolman, Lena; Lappalainen, Ilkka; Törnroos, Juha; Linden, Mikael; Spalding,
J Dylan; Ur-Rehman, Saif; Page, Angela; Flicek, Paul; Sherry, Stephen; Haussler, David; Varma, Susheel;





Nature BiotechNology | VOL 37 | MARCH 2019 | 215–226 | www.nature.com/naturebiotechnology
which should henceforth be encouraged. 
Indeed, the US congressional investigation 
on shadow pricing was spurred largely 
by coordinated action by patients made 
aware of pricing discrepancies through 
research published in a reputable medical 
journal9. Along these lines, we would 
argue that technological advancement 
in analytical tools and pricing analytics 
will be increasingly relevant under the 
current legal frameworks to establish 
direct communication and negotiation 
between payers and drug companies and to 
induce further transparency in the pricing 
process—as a major technology company 
sought to do last year14. ❐
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Federated discovery and sharing of genomic data 
using Beacons
To the Editor — The Beacon Project 
(https://github.com/ga4gh-beacon/) is a 
Global Alliance for Genomics & Health 
(GA4GH)1 initiative that enables genomic 
and clinical data sharing across federated 
networks. The project is working toward 
developing regulatory, ethics and security 
guidance to ensure proportionate safeguards 
for distribution of data according to the 
GA4GH-developed “Framework for 
Responsible Sharing of Genomic and 
Health-Related Data”2. Here we describe 
the Beacon protocol and how it can be used 
as a model for the federated discovery and 
sharing of genomic data.
A Beacon is defined as a web-accessible 
service that can be queried for information 
about a specific allele. A user of a Beacon 
can pose queries of the form “Have you 
observed this nucleotide (e.g., C) at this 
genomic location (e.g., position 32,936,732 
on chromosome 13)?” to which the Beacon 
responds with either “yes” or “no.” In this 
way, a Beacon allows allelic information of 
interest to be discovered by a remote searcher 
with no reference to a specific sample or 
patient, thereby mitigating privacy risks.
In principle, allelic information from any 
source (or species) can be distributed through 
a Beacon. For example, a Beacon may serve 
data from case-level observations, such as 
genetic variants identified from sequenced 
samples, or from annotation resources such 
as variant–disease associations curated 
from scientific literature. Along with a “yes” 
response, a Beacon may optionally disclose 
metadata, including allele frequencies, 
pathogenicity scores and associated 
phenotypes, associated with the queried 
allele. Access to Beacons is securable through 
institutional systems for authentication and 
authorization (for example, ELIXIR AAI), 
allowing hosts to enforce proportionate 
safeguards for datasets that may be sensitive 
and consented for use only by trusted 
individuals and/or for specific purposes.
The Beacon Project is demonstrating the 
willingness of international organizations  
to work together to define standards for,  
and actively engage in, genomic data 
sharing. Several organizations have ‘lit’  
(i.e., implemented) a Beacon, and these  
have been assembled into a single searchable 
network. In the years since the project’s 
inception, over 100 Beacons have been lit by 
40 organizations serving over 200 datasets. 
The datasets served through Beacons are 
searchable individually or in aggregate—for 
instance, via the Beacon Network (https://
beacon-network.org), a federated search 
engine across the world’s beacons.
Beacons are a general-purpose protocol 
for genomics data discovery and have been 
lit by both large and small organizations, 
as well as by individuals. This has made 
available datasets collected from large-
scale population sequencing efforts 
(for example, 1000 Genomes)3, clinical 
diagnostic settings, in silico predictions 
(for example, PolyPhen-2)4, expertly 
curated or crowd-sourced databases, 
scientific literature (for example, the 
Human Genome Mutation Database)5 
and variant curation efforts (for example, 
ClinVar)6. The International Cancer 
Genome Consortium7 Beacon shares 
case-level somatic variant observations 
from over 60 cancer subtypes; the 
PhenomeCentral8 Beacon shares 
observations from hundreds of clinical 
cases of undiagnosed and rare genetic 
diseases; and the BRCA Exchange (https://
brcaexchange.org/) Beacon distributes 
consensus classifications for variants 
in BRCA1 and BRCA2 cataloged by 
the ENIGMA Consortium9, as well as 
variants collected from other resources 
as part of the GA4GH BRCA Exchange 
(https://brcaexchange.org/). The 
ELIXIR hub (https://elixir-europe.org/) 
is also integrating Beacon to connect 
geographically distributed data centers 
and unify their data access methodologies. 
This will enable aggregate sharing of allelic 
observations between sites, a feature that 
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With continued adoption, Beacons will 
produce a large network of globally 
searchable genomics datasets that have the 
potential to unlock new genomics-derived 
discoveries and applications in medicine.
Beacon protocol
Many former systems for genomic data 
sharing have followed a centralized  
model, wherein data generators deposit 
information into a single repository, such  
as the Sequence Read Archive (SRA)10.  
This model requires data generators to 
transfer whole copies of datasets over the 
internet, which will become inefficient 
and expensive as the rate of genomic data 
acquisition increases. An alternative, 
federated model for data sharing1 requires 
organizations to host data independently 
and to interoperate via an agreed-upon 
technical language. This model removes  
the inefficiencies of large data transfers  
and gives host organizations more  
control over data privacy, security  
and representation.
For maximal interoperability, a Beacon 
is designed to be a communication layer 
that is compatible with any underlying 
representation of alleles or their annotations. 
For example, the GA4GH develops a data 
representation format for genomic variants 
and annotations, but in practice these data 
types may be stored in other formats as 
well (for example, VCF files or relational 
databases).
Sharing through Beacon is notably 
different from sharing fully descript data 
representations for genomic variants (for 
example, VCF) or annotations (for example, 
GFF). The Beacon protocol considers levels 
of data aggregation and obfuscation that 
can be added onto raw data representations 
(such as VCF) to convey useful information 
without explicitly referring to specific 
samples or individuals.
With these features in mind, the Beacon 
protocol was designed to be:
•	 Simple: Beacons can be implemented  
on top of any underlying variant or  
variant annotation data store.
•	 Federated: Beacons can be lit and main-
tained by individual organizations and 
assembled into a distributed network.
•	 General purpose: Beacons can be  
used to distribute any allelic dataset, 
including case-level observations or 
other annotations.
•	 Aggregative: Beacons provide a boolean 
answer to whether an allele was 
observed, possibly aggregated across  
an entire population, and therefore 
support deidentification in a way that 
sharing via VCF files does not.
•	 Securable: Beacon access can be 
restricted using institutional security 
protocols, and authorization schemes 
can be implemented to respect  
conditions consented to by patients  
and/or data owners.
The Beacon API (represented as a 
RESTful web application) provides a 
technical specification that a Beacon server 
must implement. The specification is open-
source and available online at https://github.
com/ga4gh-beacon/specification.
A Beacon has two available functions: 
the first lists information about the 
Beacon, including descriptions of the host 
organization and specific datasets that it 
serves; the second queries for the existence 
of information about specific alleles. Alleles 
are specified with chromosomal coordinates 
in addition to reference and alternate bases. 
Much as in their use in VCF, reference and 
alternative bases can be used together to 
specify exact matches for single nucleotide 
variants (SNVs) and small insertions or 
deletions. A Beacon responds either “yes” 
or “no” to signal whether the dataset(s) it 
serves have information about the queried 
allele. In the affirmative, a Beacon may 
optionally disclose metadata describing the 
observations or annotations associated with 
the queried allele. An example query and 
response is shown in Supplementary Fig. 1.
reference implementation
To simplify the process of lighting a 
Beacon, a free, open-source ‘reference 
implementation’ of the latest specification 
has been developed.
This implementation can create a public 
Beacon from a set of VCF files. It may 
be deployed locally or in a cloud-based 
environment maintained by a third-party 
provider (for example, Amazon, Google or 
Microsoft). Documentation and links to 
download and run the Beacon reference 
implementation are available (https://
github.com/ga4gh-beacon/). Third-party 
organizations, such as Cafe Variome, 
DNAstack and the European Genome-
phenome Archive (EGA), also support 
the ability to light Beacons from genetic 
variation datasets stored in those systems.
Beacon security design
In principle, access to Beacons can 
be secured through any system of 
authentication or authorization, at the 
discretion of the host organization. The 
GA4GH is promoting different levels of data 
access (open, registered, and controlled) for 
convenience and for compatibility across 
its projects. Each so-called ‘access tier’ has 
distinct visibility and requirements for 
authorization. For example, ‘open access’ 
Beacons are accessible to anonymous users 
of the internet, whereas ‘registered access’ 
Beacons are accessible to registered users 
(for example, bona fide researchers and 
clinicians) who have agreed to a set of 
conditions of data use11.
A Beacon may support one or more 
access tiers to provide progressive disclosure 
of increasingly sensitive information (for 
example, patient phenotypes and clinical 
information) as users pass through more 
stringent authentication and authorization 
checks. For example, tiered access makes 
it possible for organizations to allow 
anonymous users to discover the existence 
of an allelic observation, without the Beacon 
disclosing more information about it until 
users identify themselves. The ability 
for organizations to offer minimal data 
discovery up front can save substantial time 
and effort in data access applications when 
data might not contain relevant data points.
Beacon’s ability to reveal different 
information at specific access tiers affords 
genomic data stewards options for 
distributing allelic information, ranging 
from fully public to private. Access can be 
controlled using established authentication 
and authorization protocols (for example, 
OpenID Connect and OAuth2.0) to enforce 
proportionate safeguards for datasets that may 
be sensitive and/or consented for use only by 
trusted individuals for specific purposes.
attribute disclosure attacks and 
reidentification
The “yes” response from a Beacon signals 
the presence of an allele in a dataset 
comprising possibly many individuals’ 
genotypes, thereby mitigating risks 
associated with reidentifying specific 
individuals. Independent of their technical 
implementation, Beacon reidentification 
attempts require prior knowledge of 
genomic sequence data from the individual 
(or that of a close relative); they are arguably 
preceded by more harmful compromises 
to privacy. However, reidentification can 
pose additional risks if sensitive attributes 
about the individual can be inferred from 
Beacons (for example, HIV status or mental 
health condition). Such attacks have been 
characterized as “attribute disclosure attacks 
using DNA” (ADAD)12.
Querying a Beacon for many variants 
known to exist in a person’s genome could 
lead to confirmation of that person’s 
inclusion in a given database, potentially 
revealing sensitive information about 
that individual. The ability to reidentify 
individuals has been examined previously13 
and recently in the context of Beacons14. 
The power to reidentify an individual 
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whose genotypes are reflected through 
a Beacon depends on the number of 
individuals whose data is served, the allele 
frequency distribution of the pool, the 
scope of allowed queries (for example, 
exome versus genome), the type of DNA 
source (for example, normal tissue versus 
cancer sample) and the number of times a 
Beacon is queried. Models for population 
allele frequencies can be leveraged to reduce 
the number of queries required in such an 
attempt, but reidentification is still possible 
without using allele frequencies if a  
Beacon can be queried a large number  
of (for example, 10,000) times.
risk mitigation schemes
User agreements, data use policies and 
technical enforcement of usage quotas 
can be established to limit the possibility 
of reidentification and ADAD through 
Beacons. Organizations are advised to 
specify terms of use that explicitly prohibit 
reidentification attempts through the service. 
When the risk of ADAD is considered too 
high for data to be distributed publicly, 
data stewards are encouraged to implement 
secured access. Compared with public-access 
tiers, secured-access tiers (either registered 
or controlled) impose extra social and/or 
legal disincentives that can help prevent 
service misuse.
Beacon operators may further specify 
consent-based data use conditions from a 
structured set of Consent Codes to impose 
restrictions indicated by consent of research 
participants. These Consent Codes, which 
are general purpose and can be used 
by genomics data stewards, including 
Beacon operators, were designed with the 
purpose of supporting maximum data use 
and integration while respecting consent 
permissions15. The current set of Consent 
Codes is provided in Supplementary Table 1.
The ethical, legal and social status 
of health-related data that are typically 
considered sensitive in international policy 
and laws is being examined to provide 
guidance in aggregating Beacons and in 
implementing tiered protection of Beacon 
attributes based on sensitivity16. This 
guidance aims to enable consistent and 
proportionate provision of data protection 
for data that are considered more sensitive 
by individuals and society. Data stewards 
should consider the sensitivity of attributes 
used in describing their Beacons, as well as 
those in the data itself.
Technical provisions can also be 
used to reduce the statistical power of 
reidentification attempts. Individual Beacons 
can be combined to form a single, aggregate 
Beacon, and direct access to participating 
Beacons can be blocked. Aggregate beacons 
contain more data points than any of the 
individual Beacons while obscuring the 
origin of the data. As an example, a publicly 
accessible Beacon named Conglomerate 
has been lit as an aggregate of multiple 
independent Beacons.
An information budgeting approach 
can also be used to thwart reidentification 
attempts17, which rely on accumulating 
evidence from many queries for alleles 
carried by a specific individual. The power to 
reidentify an individual using this technique 
varies inversely with the frequency of the 
alleles being queried (i.e., very rare alleles 
are more revealing than common alleles). 
By metering the cumulative information 
disclosure for individuals, Beacons can 
be configured to restrict access before 
reidentification is possible within a desired 
level of statistical confidence.
Beacon is a general-purpose protocol 
for genomics data discovery, and as such 
can be used to distribute allelic information 
from various origins, including sequence 
observations from patients with known 
(for example, the International Cancer 
Genome Consortium)7 or unknown (e.g., 
PhenomeCentral)8 diseases, population 
studies (for example, 1000 Genomes)3, 
in silico predictions (for example, 
PolyPhen-2)4, expertly curated or crowd-
sourced databases (for example, BRCA 
Exchange and ClinVar)6, and scientific 
literature (for example, the Human Genome 
Mutation Database)5. Additional Beacon 
implementations are ongoing in Europe, 
mainly through the ELIXIR Beacon project. 
The deployment of Beacons for select use 
cases is described below.
Matchmaking
A major obstacle to discovering the causes 
of rare diseases is sample size. A single 
affected family can be enough to identify 
one or more compelling candidate variants, 
but pinpointing causal genetic variants 
frequently requires examining unrelated 
cases with a variant in the same gene and 
similar phenotypic presentations. Recently, 
patient matchmaking has been formalized 
through efforts such as the Matchmaker 
Exchange (MME)18, in which users who 
contribute a case to a database within the 
federated network can find similar cases in 
other databases within the network.
MME is a secured-access system, 
requiring that only authorized databases 
and users can contribute and exchange 
patient profiles for matching. However, 
this inherently limits the discoverability of 
BIPMed Beacon MSSNG BeaconBRCA Exchange Beacon




and returns to user
Queries the
Beacon Network
Fig. 1 | Beacon Network system architecture. The user interacts with the Beacon Network system 
by asking for information about the existence of a particular genetic mutation. The Beacon Network 
federates the query across many Beacon instances serving various types of data, such as a variant 
database, VCF files or patient records. The Beacon Network collects the responses from Beacons and 
presents aggregated information to the user. BIPMed (http://bipmed.org), the Brazilian Initiative on 
Precision Medicine, is a population sequencing effort while MSSNG (http://mss.ng) collects sequence 
information from subjects with autism and their families.
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the data, which may dissuade some users 
having candidate genes or variants they 
want to match. In addition to implementing 
the MME API19 for patient matchmaking, 
several organizations within the MME have 
lit Beacons to serve aggregate views of their 
clinical datasets more publicly. This allows 
clinicians with candidate variants to quickly 
search for existing matches within the MME.
Sequencing initiatives and archives
Large-scale sequencing initiatives, such as 
the 100,000 Genomes Project20 conducted 
by Genomics England and the Precision 
Medicine Initiative21, promise to generate 
vast volumes of genotypic and associated 
health information. Data from these 
projects, once shared, help researchers make 
inferences on the genetic determinants of 
disease by way of comparative analysis and 
association studies.
The 1000 Genomes Project3, NHLBI 
Grand Opportunity Exome Sequence Project 
(https://esp.gs.washington.edu/drupal/), 
and Exome Aggregation Consortium22 are 
exemplar large-scale initiatives that have 
shared genotypes from diverse populations 
through Beacons. As the number and scale 
of population sequencing efforts expand, a 
more accurate depiction of global sequence 
diversity will be available in aggregate 
through Beacons and the Beacon Network.
In addition, many of the largest genomic 
archives, such as dbGaP22, the European 
Genome-phenome Archive (https://www.
ebi.ac.uk/ega/home) and the European 
Variation Archive (http://www.ebi.ac.uk/
eva), have provided access to variation data 
through Beacons for some or all of their 
datasets. These Beacons collectively provide 
widespread discoverability across a large 
amount of data. Many of these resources are 
continually growing with new submissions 
and thus provide added value for data 
depositors by simplifying data distribution 
and unifying their consumption.
Beacon Network
Beacon represents a simple protocol that, 
like internet protocols such as HTTP, 
describes a method for data discovery and 
exchange between distributed, collaborative 
systems. Toward developing an ‘internet for 
genomics’, it is useful to establish a network 
of protocol adopters and an efficient 
mechanism for searching across it.
The Beacon Network is a directory 
and search engine for Beacons. Although 
individual Beacons answer the question 
“Have you observed this allele?”, the Beacon 
Network answers the question “Who has 
observed this allele?”. The Beacon Network 
serves as a powerful, convenient and real-
time genomic data distribution channel 
through which users can discover the 
existence of alleles of interest and be directed 
to host organizations who have observed 
them. A schematic of the Beacon Network 
as a global federated network for genomic 
information discovery is shown in Fig. 1.
The Beacon Network is accessible either 
through its website or programmatically 
through an API, and enables fast, 
simultaneous search of hundreds of datasets 
from hundreds of thousands of individuals 
already served through Beacons worldwide.
Beacons can be freely registered to 
the Beacon Network and can be searched 
independently or in aggregate with other 
connected Beacons. The Beacon Network 
has received over 1.5 million queries in the 
three years since its launch. The value of 
datasets connected to the Beacon Network 
increases as more Beacons join, particularly 
for comparative applications like rare disease 
and donor matching.
conclusions and perspectives
The first version of the Beacon Project 
has validated the feasibility of a globally 
federated system for genomic data  
sharing. The conceptual and technical 
simplicity of the discovery question,  
“Have you observed this allele?”, enabled 
rapid and widespread adoption, and this 
has served to provide practical feedback 
for the GA4GH to continue to advance its 
best practices by holistically addressing 
regulatory, security and technical aspects of 
global genomics data sharing. However, the 
narrow focus of the initial Beacon question 
limits its utility to support other closely 
related use cases, and successive iterations  
of the protocol are planned to enable 
coverage of these.
Future extensions to the Beacon protocol 
may include the following:
•	 Support for discovering complex 
genomic alterations, including copy 
number variations (CNVs) and somatic 
copy number alterations (CNAs), 
which are major contributors to both 
inter-individual variation and disease 
susceptibility and prominent features of 
the oncogenomic mutation landscape;
•	 Integration of non-genomics data  
in queries, including the ability to 
discover similar cases on the basis of 
associated metadata;
•	 Support for quantitative attributes  
in responses (for example, allele  
frequencies) to facilitate statistical  
analyses that combine information  
disclosed through multiple Beacons;
•	 Handoff to services by which users may 
access additional information about a 
queried variant.
The development of data-rich extensions 
to the Beacon protocol will leverage 
the expertise of GA4GH members and 
stakeholders to iteratively design and 
evaluate the technical, privacy and security 
considerations in evolving Beacons to  
enable unprecedented access to genomics 
and clinical datasets through a global, 
federated ecosystem. ❐
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CRISPResso2 provides accurate and rapid 
genome editing sequence analysis
To the Editor — The field of genome 
editing is advancing rapidly1, most recently 
exemplified by the advent of base editors 
that enable changing single nucleotides in 
a predictable manner2–4. For the validation 
and characterization of genome editing 
experiments, targeted amplicon sequencing 
has become the gold standard5. Here we 
present a substantially updated version 
of our CRISPResso tool6 to facilitate the 
analysis of data that would be difficult to 
handle with existing tools6–9.
CRISPResso2 introduces five key 
innovations: first, comprehensive analysis of 
sequencing data from base editors; second, 
a batch mode for analyzing and comparing 
multiple editing experiments; third, allele-
specific quantification of heterozygous or 
polymorphic references; fourth,  
a biologically informed alignment algorithm; 
and fifth, ultrafast processing time.  
We discuss each of these in turn below.
Our updated software allows users to 
readily quantify and visualize amplicon 
sequencing data from base-editing 
experiments. It takes as input raw FASTQ 
sequencing files and outputs reports 
describing frequencies and efficiencies of 
base editing activity, plots showing base 
substitutions across the entire amplicon 
region (Fig. 1a), and nucleotide substitution 
frequencies for a region specified by the user 
(Fig. 1b). Users can also specify the nucleotide 
substitution (for example, C→T or A→G) 
that is relevant for the base editor used, and 
the software produces publication-quality 
plots for nucleotides of interest with heat 
maps showing conversion efficiency.
We also improved processing time and 
memory usage of CRISPResso2 to enable 
users to analyze, visualize and compare 
results from hundreds of genome editing 
experiments using batch functionality. This 
is particularly useful when many input 
FASTQ files must to be aligned to the same 
amplicon or have the same guides, and the 
genome editing efficiencies and outcomes 
can be visualized together. In addition, 
CRISPResso2 generates intuitive plots to 
show the nucleotide frequencies and indel 
rates at each position in each sample. This 
allows users to easily visualize the results 
and extent of editing in their experiments 
for different enzymes (Fig. 1c).
In cases where the genome editing target 
contains more than one allele (for example, 
when heterozygous single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) are present), 
genome editing on each allele must be 
quantified separately, even though reads 
from both alleles are amplified and mixed 
in the same input FASTQ file. Current 
strategies are not capable of analyzing 
multiple reference alleles and may lead 
to incorrect quantification. CRISPResso2 
enables allele-specific quantification by 
aligning individual reads to each allelic 
variant and assigning each read to the 
most closely aligned allele. Downstream 
processing is performed separately for 
each allele so that insertions, deletions or 
substitutions that distinguish each allele  
are not confounded with genome editing. 
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, 
we reanalyzed amplicon sequencing data 
from a mouse with a heterozygous SNP 
at the Rho gene in which an engineered 
SaCas9-KKH nuclease was directed to 
the P23H mutant allele10. CRISPResso2 
deconvoluted reads, quantified insertions 
and deletions from each allele, and 
produced intuitive visualizations of 
experimental outcomes (Fig. 1d).
Existing amplicon sequencing analysis 
toolkits ignore the biological understanding 
of genome editing and instead optimize 
the alignment on the basis of sequence 
identity only. However, this can lead to 
incorrect quantification of indel events, 
especially in sequences with short repetitive 
subsequences where the location of indels 
may be ambiguous as a result of multiple 
alignments with the same best score. In such 
cases, it is reasonable to assume that indels 
should overlap with the predicted nuclease 
cleavage site. Our improved alignment 
algorithm extends the Needleman–Wunsch 
algorithm with a mechanism to incentivize 
the assignment of insertions or deletions to 
